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Legal Regulation of

Other changes have.also played a role. One is the
migration from constitutional law to family law of
notions of individual privacy and autonomy. Another
is the increased dissociation of law and morality. A
final factor is the application of economic analysis and
rational choice theory to behavior in and around the
family. Although I think all four of these factors are
important, this paper will focus on the link between
privatization and gender equality. (I have addressed
the other factors at greater length in [ana Singer, The
Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1443.)

Marriage: From Status
to Contract and
Back Again?
lana B. Singer
The purpose of this paper is to give a brief historical
overview of the way in which the American legal system has traditionally regulated marriage. I believe that
such an historical perspective is important for a number of reasons. First, it reminds us that there was a
time when marriage played a much more central role
in our legal system than it does today. This was a time
when the legal system deliberately encouraged and
privileged marriage, two of the things that a number
of conference participants have advocated. While this
previous legal regime arguably had some benefits, it
also rested on assumptions and incorporated key elements that are inconsistent with modern notions of
gender equality and individual choice. Thus, a key
question becomes whether one can use the legal system to "reinstitutionalize" marriage without also reinstitutionalizing the particular gendered and hierarchical structure that characterized this traditional legal
regime. Such an historical perspective helps explain
why there is so much reluctance among legal scholars
to talk about marriage. Like it or not, the "M" word
does come with a great deal of legal baggage and it is
important to examine that baggage carefully in order
to decide which pieces are worth retaining and which
pieces are not.

Traditionally, American law treated marriage as a distinct and exclusive legal status. What this means is
that, by virtue of entering into marriage, individuals
automatically acquired a distinct set of legal rights
and obligations. These legal rights and obligations
were exclusive to marriagethat is, you did not get
them until and unless you married and they attached
to all marriages, regardless of whether any particular
couple or any particular spouse accepted them or
desired them.
The United States Supreme Court captured this notion
of marriage as a distinct legal status in a well-known
1888 opinion. The Court wrote:
Marriage is something more than a mere contract.
The consent of the parties is, of course, essential to
its existence, but when the contract to marry ..is
executed, a relation between the parties is created
which they cannot change. Other contracts may
be modified, restricted or enlarged or entirely
released upon the consent of the parties, but not
so with marriage. The relation, once formed, the
law stepped in and holds the parties to various
obligations and liabilities. [Maynard v Hill, 125 U.S.
190, 205 (1888).]

I take as my point of departure the claim made by a
number of scholars that changes in the legal regula.
tion of marriage reflect a steady transformation from
marriage as (predominantly) a public status to marriage as (predominantly) a private contract. I think
this claim is largely correct, but I believe that insufficient attention has been paid to some of the reasons
for this transformation. In particular, I think that what
some have termed the "privatization" of marriage is
closely linked to notions of gender equality, particularly equality before the law. In other words, the impetus
to make marriage more private, and less public, was
to a large extent fueled by widespread changes in
gender roles that challenged the traditional legal
structure of marriage.

Well, what were these various obligations and liabilities that the law bestowed on married persons? One
of the most striking things about them is that they
were extremely gendered. Husbands, by virtue of
marriage, acquired one set of legal rights and obliqations, while wives acquired (or were forced to assume)
another quite different set. Put another way, the legal
status of husband was significantly different from the
legal status of wife.
Perhaps the starkest illustration of these differences
was the common-law doctrine of marital merger.
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sue or. be sued in their own names. Moreover, a married woman was not the owner of any wages she
might earn from employment outside the home.
Rather, such wages were considered the legal property of the husband. Nor could husbands contract to
pay their wives for domestic work, since this, in
essence, would amount to a husband paying himself.

Under this doctrine, marriage quite literally stripped
women of their existence as independent legal actors.
The famous English jurist, William Blackstone,
explained the doctrine this way:
By marriage the husband and wife are one person
in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of
the woman is suspended during marriage, or, at
least is incorporated into that of the husband,
under whose wing, protection and cover she performs everything; and is therefore called in our
law-french a femme-covert; is said to be coverbaron, or under the protection and influence of
her husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition
during her marriage is called her coverture. Under
this principle, of the union of person in husband
and wife, depend almost all the legal rights, duties
and disabilities that either of them acquire by the
marriage. [ William Blackstone, Commentaries
'442.]

The marital merger doctrine also had a significant
impact on the legal relationship between the spouses.
Because husband and wife are considered one person
in law, they can neither contract with nor sue each
other. Nor could spouses testify for or against each
other in civil or criminal proceedings. More generally,
the legal fiction that the husband and wife were a single entity was one of the rationales that supported the
law's traditional refusal to recognize marital rape or to
provide remedies for victims of spousal violence.
Although most of the specific legal disabilities associated with the marital merger doctrine were formally
abandoned in the late 19th century with the passage
of the Married Women's Property Acts, the notion of
married persons as a single legal entity continued to
exert a significant influence over the laws affecting
spouses well into the 20th century. As late as 1958,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the evidentiary rule
that precluded spouses from testifying against each
other in criminal cases; that rule was later modified to
allow the witness spouse alone to decide whether to
testify. [See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40
91980) (overruling Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S.
74 (1958».] Similarly, inter-spousal tort immunitythat is, the restriction on spouses suing each other for
civil wrongs, persisted in a majority of States until the
mid-1970s and still exists in modified form in a few
jurisdictions. Still more tenacious is the common law
rule that a husband is legally incapable of raping his
wife; this remnant of the marital unity doctrine persisted intact until the 1980's, and it continues to influence the criminal law in a number of states.

Some 100 years after Blackstone wrote, the late
Supreme Court Justice, Hugo Black, described the
marital merger doctrine a bit more succinctly. "This
rule has worked out in reality to mean that though
the husband and wife are one, that one is the husband." [United States v. Yeazell, 382 U.S. 341, 361
(1966).]
The doctrine of marital merger had far-reaching legal
consequences for women in a wide variety of areas.
For example, married women were precluded from
entering into legally binding contracts - not just with
their husbands, but with anyone. In a famous turn of
the century Supreme Court case, the State of Illinois
successfully relied on this contractual disability as a
justification for excluding all women from the legal
profession. [Bradwell v. II/inois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130
(1973).] Interestingly, the Supreme Court acknowledged that many women were unmarried, and therefore not affected by any of the duties and incapacities
arising out of marriage. However, the Court viewed
these women as "exceptions to the general rule" and
to women's "paramount destiny" as wives and mothers; the state of Illinois was not required to tailor its
laws for such "unusual or extraordinary circum-

This brief historical description of the traditional
notion of marital merger may help explain why so
many feminist scholars are wary of calls to reinstitutionalize marriage.

stances."
Long after formal abandonment of the marital merger
doctrine, the State continued to define the terms of
marriage in ways that were both hierarchal and gender-based. The husband, as the legal head of house-

In addition to disabling women from making contracts, marriage also deprived women of the ability to
manage and control their own real property and to
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ments between husbands and wives on the ground
that these agreements lacked the essential quid pro
quo necessary to create a legally binding contract. For
example, an early Wisconsin case held that a husband's promise to support his wife did not constitute
valid consideration for the wife's return promise to
devise property to him since, by pledging his continued financial support, the husband had promised only
what the law already required of him. [Ryan v.
Dockery, 114 N.W. 820 (1908).] Similarly, a Virginia
court found that a married woman's promise to give
up her pre-home and business in order to follow her
husband across the country was merely the performance of her legal and moral duty as a wife and
hence did not constitute valid consideration for her
husband's written agreement to release all rights in
her estate. [Ballard v. Cox, 62 S.E.2d 1 (Va. 1950).]

hold, was responsible for the financial support of his
wife and children; the wife, as the domestic partner,
was responsible for providing household services,
including housework, child care and sex.
To be sure, nobody actually wrote out these statedefined obligations and gave them to couples when
they married. Moreover, because of the law's reluctance to "intervene" in an ongoing marriage, it has
always been quite difficult for spouses to enforce any
marital rights or obliqations while a marriage is intact.
But the legal system did enforce the gender-based
terms of the traditional marriage contract in a number
of other ways. In particular, both the requirements for,
and consequences of, divorce reflected these stateimposed obligations. Under the fault-based divorce
regime, for example, a wife who refused to go along
with her husband's choice of domicile could be found
guilty of desertion, which was a common, fault-based
ground for divorce.

Thus, the gender-based terms of the traditional marriage contract were not simply what the economists
call "default rules" - provisions that apply only if-the
parties have not agreed to the contrary. Rather, they
were state-imposed elements of marriage, that the
parties could not change (in any legally enforceable
way) even if they both desired to do so.

Wives who had fulfilled their marital obligations were
(in theory) entitled to alimony in the event of a
divorce, since alimony was seen as a continuation of
the husband's marital support obligations. However,
wives who were deemed "at fault" in a divorce - for
example, the wife who had an affair, or who objected
to her husband's choice of domicile - generally forfeited their entitlement to alimony, regardless of their
financial need. And wives could never be ordered to
pay alimony, regardless of their financial means, since
wives were not legally obligated to support their husbands financially. Quite a disincentive for the reversal
of gender roles during marriage.

Another key way in which the law traditionally
defined marriage as a distinct legal status was by distinguishing Sharply in virtually all important contexts
between married persons and persons in intimate
relationships outside of marriage. Laws criminalizing
adultery, fornication, and non-marital cohabitation
effectively carved out marriage as the only legitimate
arena for sexual intercourse. On the civil side, the
availability of private tort remedies for things like
enticement and alienation of affections penalized third
parties who intentionally interfered with the marriage
relationship. Claims for loss of consortium protected
husbands and later, wives, against third parties who
negligently impaired marital relations. No similar
legal doctrines protected non-marital intimate relationships from such deliberate or negligent third-party
impairment.

The law also employed a number of devices to prevent spouses from modifying the State-imposed terms
of the marriage contract. Under traditional contract
law doctrine, private agreements that purported to
change the "essential incidents of marriage"defined as the husband support duties and the wife's
domestic obligations - were void as a matter of public policy. [See Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936
(E.D. Mich. 1940).] As courts routinely explained,
public policy in such a vital matter as the marriage
contract should not be made to yield to subversive
private agreements and personal considerations.

Nor were unmarried cohabitants afforded access to
the courts to resolve financial or property disputes
arising from the breakup of their relationship. And the
law was very clear about why. Persons involved in
such non-marital relationships had engaged in illegal
and/or immoral conduct, and the judicial system
should not lend its hand to help them work out their

Other, more specific, contract doctrines further
restricted the opportunities for private ordering within
marriage. Courts sometimes refused to enforce agree131
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differences when those illicit relationships dissolved.
[See, e.g., Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81, 83 (Ga.
1976).]
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Let me briefly use the no-fault divorce revolution as a
final illustration of the transformation from marriageas-status to marriage-as-contract. Under the faultbased divorce regime, it was the State that determined whether and when a couple could dissolve
their union. A spouse who sought to enter marriage
had to prove to a court that her partner had breached
his State-imposed obligations and that she was innocent of marital fault. If a spouse seeking a divorce
failed to establish one of the State-sanctioned grounds
for terminating a marriage, she couldn't legally end
her union, even if both she and her spouse desired to
do so. Indeed, under the doctrine of recrimination, if
a court found that both spouses had breached their
marital obligations, neither could obtain a divorce.
They would be punished by being forced to stay
together.

An elaborate network of statutes and common-law
doctrines also distinguished sharply between children
born within a marriage and those born outside of it.
As one family historian has explained, "[t]he law used
matrimony to separate legal from spurious issue. It
defined the latter as filius-nullius, the child and heir of
no one." Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth:
law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America,
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, p. 197
(1988). Similarly, state and federal programs
designed to compensate families for the death or disability of a wage earner typically excluded out-of-wedlock children as eligible beneficiaries. A major justification for these sharp legal distinctions between marital
and non-marital children was to protect the exclusivity of the marital unit and to punish adults who
engaged in sex outside of marriage. [See Singer, The
Privatization
of Family Law, 1992 Wis. l. Rev. 14461449.]

Thus, under the fault-based divorce regime, divorce
was decidedly not the recognition of a private decision to terminate a marriage, whether that decision.
was mutual or unilateral. Instead it was a privilege
granted by the State to an innocent spouse against a
guilty one. Moreover, a finding of guilt in a faultbased divorce proceeding had consequences that
endured long beyond the breakup of the marriage.
Fault was a significant determinant of the financial
and parenting consequences of divorce, and in many
States, it restricted a party's ability to remarry, often
for a number of years after the divorce.

Over the past 30 years, the Supreme Court has eliminated as unconstitutional most of the categorical legal
distinctions between marital and non-marital children.
In particular, these Supreme Court cases have explicitly rejected the traditional notion that differential treatment of children born inside and outside of marriage
is justified as a way of encouraging matrimony and of
expressing society's condemnation of liaisons beyond
the bounds of marriage. [See Weber v. Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).]

With the adoption of no-fault divorce statutes, the
State ceded to the spouses, themselves, indeed often
to one spouse acting unilaterally, the authority to
make these decisions. Under a no-fault divorce
regime, the decision to end a marriage generally rests
on un reviewed private judgment. The State's role is
diminished to one of solemnization and recording,
akin to its role in marital licensing. Thus, the current
debate over reviving fault requirements for divorce is,
in many respects, a debate about public vs private
control of marriage - about marriage as (predominantly) a public status vs. marriage as a private
contract.

In reality, the economic and social circumstances of
children born or raised outside of marriage continue
to be significantly more precarious than those of their
marital counterparts. And some legal distinctions
between marital and non-marital children continue to
exist. But the legal distinctions that remain are more
likely to reflect the difficulties of proving paternity
than they are to demarcate a separate and unequal
legal status for children born out-of-wedlock. As
Professor Mary Ann Glendon has noted, this equalization of the legal status of marital and non-marital children has "gone far toward depriving formal marriage
of one of its traditionally most important effects: That
. of distinguishing the legitimate family from all others." Mary Ann Glendon, Transformation of Family
law: State, law and Family p. 82 (1989).

What does the very brief history that I've sketched
counsel about how to evaluate such contemporary
efforts? One important thing this history tells me is
that the move from status to contract in family law
was inexorably linked to the rethinking of traditional
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about the asserted link between privatization and
gender equality. By the same token, the history of
marriage as a distinctly gendered legal status should
cause marriage advocates to think harder about what
it should mean to reinstitutionalize marriage as a public status.

gender roles and the push for gender equality before
the law.
Because the traditional State-imposed marriage contract both stereotyped and subordinated women, limitations on divorce, and on the contractual freedom of
spouses, became identified with the perpetuation of
inequality between the sexes. It made sense for advocates of gender equality to espouse contractual freedom in and around marriage as one way of avoiding
the sexism of the traditional State-imposed marriage
rules. At the same time, supporters of marital contracting and unilateral divorce were able to use gender equality arguments to support their calls for
increased private ordering.

Obviously, dissatisfaction with conceptualizing marriage solely as a vehicle for individual fulfillment is part
of what brings all of us here and what informs the
larger public policy effort to strengthen marriage. But
to avoid the inequalities of the past, advocates must
be willing to look inside the black box of marriage
and to ask what kind of public and private institution
it is that we seek to reinvigorate. Only then will it be
possible to strengthen marriage in ways that are consistent with notions of equal respect and gender
equality in both the public and private spheres.

Contemporary research about the effects of divorce
on women has caused many scholars to think critically
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